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dropbear: bump to 2025.89 (CVE-2025-14282, CVE-2019-6111)
- Security: Avoid privilege escalation via unix stream forwarding in Dropbear server. Other programs on a system may authenticate unix sockets via SO_PEERCRED, which would be root user for Dropbear forwarded connections, allowing root privilege escalation. Reported by Turistu, and thanks for advice on the fix. This is tracked as CVE-2025-14282, and affects 2024.84 to 2025.88. It is fixed by dropping privileges of the dropbear process after authentication. Unix stream sockets are now disallowed when a forced command is used, either with authorized_key restrictions or "dropbear -c command". In previous affected releases running with "dropbear -j" (will also disable TCP fowarding) or building with localoptions.h/distrooptions.h "#define DROPBEAR_SVR_LOCALSTREAMFWD 0" is a mitigation. - Security: Include scp fix for CVE-2019-6111. This allowed a malicious server to overwrite arbitrary local files. The missing fix was reported by Ashish Kunwar. - Server dropping privileges post-auth is enabled by default. This requires setresgid() support, so some platforms such as netbsd or macos will have to disable DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS in localoptions.h. Unix stream forwarding is not available if DROPBEAR_SVR_DROP_PRIVS is disabled. Remote server TCP socket forwarding will now use OS privileged port restrictions rather than having a fixed "allow >=1024 for non-root" rule. A future release may implement privilege dropping for netbsd/macos. - Fix a regression in 2025.87 when RSA and DSS are not built. This would lead to a crash at startup with bad_bufptr(). Reported by Dani Schmitt and Sebastian Priebe. - Don't limit channel window to 500MB. That is could cause stuck connections if peers advise a large window and don't send an increment within 500MB. Affects SSH.NET https://github.com/sshnet/SSH.NET/issues/1671 Reported by Rob Hague. - Ignore -g -s when passwords arent enabled. Patch from Norbert Lange. Ignore -m (disable MOTD), -j/-k (tcp forwarding) when not enabled. - Report SIGBUS and SIGTRAP signals. Patch from Loïc Mangeonjean. - Fix incorrect server auth delay. Was meant to be 250-350ms, it was actually 150-350ms or possibly negative (zero). Reported by pickaxprograms. - Fix building without public key options. Thanks to Konstantin Demin - Fix building with proxycmd but without netcat. Thanks to Konstantin Demin - Fix incorrect path documentation for distrooptions, thanks to Todd Zullinger - Fix SO_REUSEADDR for TCP tests, reported by vt-alt. Dropped: * 050-dropbear-multihop-fix.patch as its included in the release 5cc0127000db5f * 051-fix-pubkey-options.patch as its included in the release 1d4c4a542cd5df * 052-fix-missing-depends-for-sntrup761x25519-sha512.patch as its included in the release 1a2c1e649a1824 * 053-Don-t-limit-channel-window-to-500MB.patch as its included in the release a8610f7b98ad Manually rebased: * 110-change_user.patch Fixes: CVE-2025-14282, CVE-2019-6111 Reviewed-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com> Tested-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com> [mediatek/filogic (GL.iNet GL-MT6000)] Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/21186 Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@
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include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=dropbear
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PKG_VERSION:=2025.88
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PKG_RELEASE:=4
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PKG_VERSION:=2025.89
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PKG_RELEASE:=1
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PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \
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https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/ \
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https://dropbear.nl/mirror/releases/
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PKG_HASH:=783f50ea27b17c16da89578fafdb6decfa44bb8f6590e5698a4e4d3672dc53d4
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PKG_HASH:=0d1f7ca711cfc336dc8a85e672cab9cfd8223a02fe2da0a4a7aeb58c9e113634
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PKG_LICENSE:=MIT
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PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENSE libtomcrypt/LICENSE libtommath/LICENSE
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@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
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From 5cc0127000db5f7567b54d0495fb91a8e452fe09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 9 May 2025 22:39:35 +0300
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Subject: Fix proxycmd without netcat
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fixes e5a0ef27c2 "Execute multihop commands directly, no shell"
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Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
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Forwarded: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/363
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---
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src/cli-main.c | 12 +++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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--- a/src/cli-main.c
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+++ b/src/cli-main.c
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@@ -77,7 +77,11 @@ int main(int argc, char ** argv) {
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}
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#if DROPBEAR_CLI_PROXYCMD
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- if (cli_opts.proxycmd || cli_opts.proxyexec) {
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+ if (cli_opts.proxycmd
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+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
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+ || cli_opts.proxyexec
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+#endif
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+ ) {
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cli_proxy_cmd(&sock_in, &sock_out, &proxy_cmd_pid);
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if (signal(SIGINT, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
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signal(SIGTERM, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
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@@ -110,11 +114,13 @@ static void shell_proxy_cmd(const void *
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dropbear_exit("Failed to run '%s'\n", cmd);
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}
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+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
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static void exec_proxy_cmd(const void *unused) {
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(void)unused;
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run_command(cli_opts.proxyexec[0], cli_opts.proxyexec, ses.maxfd);
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dropbear_exit("Failed to run '%s'\n", cli_opts.proxyexec[0]);
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}
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+#endif
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static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, pid_t *pid_out) {
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char * cmd_arg = NULL;
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@@ -145,9 +151,11 @@ static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in,
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cmd_arg = m_malloc(shell_cmdlen);
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snprintf(cmd_arg, shell_cmdlen, "exec %s", cli_opts.proxycmd);
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exec_fn = shell_proxy_cmd;
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+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
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} else {
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/* No shell */
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exec_fn = exec_proxy_cmd;
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+#endif
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}
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ret = spawn_command(exec_fn, cmd_arg, sock_out, sock_in, NULL, pid_out);
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@@ -159,6 +167,7 @@ static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in,
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cleanup:
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m_free(cli_opts.proxycmd);
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m_free(cmd_arg);
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+#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
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if (cli_opts.proxyexec) {
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char **a = NULL;
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for (a = cli_opts.proxyexec; *a; a++) {
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@@ -166,6 +175,7 @@ cleanup:
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}
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m_free(cli_opts.proxyexec);
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}
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+#endif
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}
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static void kill_proxy_sighandler(int UNUSED(signo)) {
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@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
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From 91877a0337f432fd29bb1041be5599ea706e5de6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2025 14:13:35 +0300
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Subject: fix build without pubkey options
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fixes:
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- 98ef42a856 "Don't set pubkey_info directly in checkpubkey_line"
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- 62ea53c1e5 "Implement no-touch-required and verify-requred for authorized_keys file"
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Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
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Forwarded: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/374
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---
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src/svr-authpubkey.c | 10 +++++++++-
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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--- a/src/svr-authpubkey.c
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+++ b/src/svr-authpubkey.c
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@@ -186,12 +186,14 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {
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#if DROPBEAR_SK_ECDSA || DROPBEAR_SK_ED25519
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key->sk_flags_mask = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
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+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
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if (ses.authstate.pubkey_options && ses.authstate.pubkey_options->no_touch_required_flag) {
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key->sk_flags_mask &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
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}
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if (ses.authstate.pubkey_options && ses.authstate.pubkey_options->verify_required_flag) {
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key->sk_flags_mask |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
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}
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+#endif /* DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS */
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#endif
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/* create the data which has been signed - this a string containing
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@@ -513,7 +515,13 @@ static int checkpubkey(const char* keyal
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line_num++;
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ret = checkpubkey_line(line, line_num, filename, keyalgo, keyalgolen,
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- keyblob, keybloblen, &ses.authstate.pubkey_info);
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+ keyblob, keybloblen,
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+#if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
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+ &ses.authstate.pubkey_info
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+#else
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+ NULL
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+#endif
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+ );
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if (ret == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
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break;
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}
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@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
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From 4bc1e18948d0918bcb1338a5f1e7856478abf985 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2025 10:02:44 +0300
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Subject: fix missing depends for sntrup761x25519-sha512
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fixes 440b7b5c4f "Add sntrup761x25519-sha512 post-quantum key exchange"
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Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
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Forwarded: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/375
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---
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src/sysoptions.h | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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--- a/src/sysoptions.h
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+++ b/src/sysoptions.h
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@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
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/* LTC SHA384 depends on SHA512 */
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#define DROPBEAR_SHA512 ((DROPBEAR_SHA2_512_HMAC) || (DROPBEAR_ECC_521) \
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|| (DROPBEAR_SHA384) || (DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP16) \
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- || (DROPBEAR_ED25519))
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+ || (DROPBEAR_ED25519) || (DROPBEAR_SNTRUP761))
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#define DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP14 ((DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP14_SHA256) || (DROPBEAR_DH_GROUP14_SHA1))
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@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
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From a8610f7b98ad4b33ab723602863d60d462fa5af2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
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Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2025 19:46:01 +0800
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Subject: Don't limit channel window to 500MB
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Previously the channel window and increments were limited to 500MB.
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That is incorrect and causes stuck connections if peers advertise
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a large window, then don't send an increment within the first 500MB.
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That's seen with SSH.NET https://github.com/sshnet/SSH.NET/issues/1671
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---
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src/common-channel.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
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src/sysoptions.h | 3 ---
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2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/common-channel.c
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+++ b/src/common-channel.c
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@@ -858,17 +858,21 @@ void common_recv_msg_channel_data(struct Channel *channel, int fd,
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void recv_msg_channel_window_adjust() {
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struct Channel * channel;
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- unsigned int incr;
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+ unsigned int incr, newwin;
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channel = getchannel();
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incr = buf_getint(ses.payload);
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- TRACE(("received window increment %d", incr))
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- incr = MIN(incr, TRANS_MAX_WIN_INCR);
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+ TRACE(("received window increment %u", incr))
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- channel->transwindow += incr;
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- channel->transwindow = MIN(channel->transwindow, TRANS_MAX_WINDOW);
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-
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+ newwin = channel->transwindow + incr;
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+ if (newwin < channel->transwindow) {
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+ /* Integer overflow, clamp it at maximum.
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+ * Behaviour may be unexpected, senders MUST NOT overflow per rfc4254. */
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+ TRACE(("overflow window, prev %u", channel->transwindow));
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+ newwin = 0xffffffff;
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+ }
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+ channel->transwindow = newwin;
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}
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/* Increment the incoming data window for a channel, and let the remote
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@@ -906,7 +910,6 @@ void recv_msg_channel_open() {
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remotechan = buf_getint(ses.payload);
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transwindow = buf_getint(ses.payload);
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- transwindow = MIN(transwindow, TRANS_MAX_WINDOW);
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transmaxpacket = buf_getint(ses.payload);
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transmaxpacket = MIN(transmaxpacket, TRANS_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN);
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--- a/src/sysoptions.h
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+++ b/src/sysoptions.h
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@@ -243,9 +243,6 @@
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#define RECV_MAX_PACKET_LEN (MAX(35000, ((RECV_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN)+100)))
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/* for channel code */
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-#define TRANS_MAX_WINDOW 500000000 /* 500MB is sufficient, stopping overflow */
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-#define TRANS_MAX_WIN_INCR 500000000 /* overflow prevention */
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-
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#define RECV_WINDOWEXTEND (opts.recv_window / 3) /* We send a "window extend" every
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RECV_WINDOWEXTEND bytes */
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#define MAX_RECV_WINDOW (10*1024*1024) /* 10 MB should be enough */
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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--- a/src/svr-chansession.c
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+++ b/src/svr-chansession.c
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@@ -984,12 +984,12 @@ static void execchild(const void *user_d
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--- a/src/svr-auth.c
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+++ b/src/svr-auth.c
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@@ -510,9 +510,9 @@ void svr_switch_user(void) {
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/* We can only change uid/gid as root ... */
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if (getuid() == 0) {
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@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@
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+ ses.authstate.pw_gid) < 0))) {
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dropbear_exit("Error changing user group");
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}
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@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ void svr_switch_user(void) {
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}
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#endif
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- if (setuid(ses.authstate.pw_uid) < 0) {
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+ if ((ses.authstate.pw_uid != 0) && (setuid(ses.authstate.pw_uid) < 0)) {
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dropbear_exit("Error changing user");
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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--- a/configure.ac
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+++ b/configure.ac
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@@ -86,54 +86,6 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(harden,
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@@ -80,54 +80,6 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(harden,
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if test "$hardenbuild" -eq 1; then
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AC_MSG_NOTICE(Checking for available hardened build flags:)
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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--- a/configure.ac
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+++ b/configure.ac
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@@ -44,11 +44,8 @@ fi
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@@ -38,11 +38,8 @@ fi
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# LTM_CFLAGS is given to ./configure by the user,
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# DROPBEAR_LTM_CFLAGS is substituted in the LTM Makefile.in
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DROPBEAR_LTM_CFLAGS="$LTM_CFLAGS"
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