diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile index 3e98c621b5d..e191622eabc 100644 --- a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile +++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=dnsmasq PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION:=2.92 PKG_VERSION:=$(subst test,~~test,$(subst rc,~rc,$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION))) -PKG_RELEASE:=1 +PKG_RELEASE:=2 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION).tar.xz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/ diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/001-CVE-2026-2291.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/001-CVE-2026-2291.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2bb36bccd60 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/001-CVE-2026-2291.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +commit ec2fbfbbdaa7d7db1c707dce26ce1a37cfe09660 +Author: Simon Kelley +Date: Fri Apr 10 16:29:31 2026 +0100 + + Fix buffer overflow in struct bigname. CVE-2026-2291 + + All buffers capable of holding a domain name should be + at least MAXDNAME*2 + 1 bytes long, where MAXDNAME is the maximum + size of a domain name. The accounts for the trailing zero and the + fact that some characters are escaped in the internal representation + of a domain name in dnsmasq. + + The declaration of struct bigname get this wrong, with the effect + that a remote attacker capable of asking DNS queries or answering DNS + queries can cause a large OOB write in the heap. + + This was first spotted by Andrew S. Fasano. + +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h +@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ struct interface_name { + }; + + union bigname { +- char name[MAXDNAME]; ++ char name[(2*MAXDNAME) + 1]; + union bigname *next; /* freelist */ + }; + diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/002-CVE-2026-4890.dnsmasq-2.92.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/002-CVE-2026-4890.dnsmasq-2.92.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cfeb0770f2e --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/002-CVE-2026-4890.dnsmasq-2.92.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +commit 4fdb707633afe8028118bcaf39b4882f634b5999 +Author: Simon Kelley +Date: Fri Apr 10 16:24:02 2026 +0100 + + Fix NSEC bitmap parsing infinite loop. CVE-2026-4890 + + Report from Royce M . + + Location: dnssec.c:1290-1306, dnssec.c:1450-1463 + + The bitmap window iteration advances by p[1] instead of p[1]+2 + (missing the 2-byte window header). With bitmap_length=0, both rdlen and p are + unchanged, causing an infinite loop and dnsmasq stops responding to all queries. + + Reachable before RRSIG validation + (confirmed by the source comment at line 2125), so no valid + DNSSEC signatures are needed. + +--- a/src/dnssec.c ++++ b/src/dnssec.c +@@ -1344,8 +1344,8 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(stru + break; /* finished checking */ + } + +- rdlen -= p[1]; +- p += p[1]; ++ rdlen -= p[1] + 2; ++ p += p[1] + 2; + } + + return 0; +@@ -1508,8 +1508,8 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct d + break; /* finished checking */ + } + +- rdlen -= p[1]; +- p += p[1]; ++ rdlen -= p[1] + 2; ++ p += p[1] + 2; + } + + return 1; diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/003-CVE-2026-4891.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/003-CVE-2026-4891.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a4fdc36b0df --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/003-CVE-2026-4891.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +commit 2cacea42e4d45717bd0ce3ccfe8e78960245e5da +Author: Simon Kelley +Date: Wed Mar 25 23:04:08 2026 +0000 + + Verify rdlen field in RRSIG packets. CVE-2026-4891 + + Bug report from Royce M + + This avoids crafted packets which give a value for rdlen _less_ + then the space taken up by the fixed data and the signer's name + and engender a negative calculated length for the signature. + +--- a/src/dnssec.c ++++ b/src/dnssec.c +@@ -546,10 +546,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st + + *ttl_out = ttl; + } +- ++ ++ /* Don't trust rdlen not to be too small and give us a negative sig_len ++ It has already been checked that it doesn't run us off the end ++ of the packet. */ ++ if ((sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav)) <= 0) ++ return STAT_BOGUS; ++ + sig = p; +- sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav); +- + nsigttl = htonl(orig_ttl); + + hash->update(ctx, 18, psav); diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/004-CVE-2026-4892.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/004-CVE-2026-4892.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0867522a21e --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/004-CVE-2026-4892.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +commit 011a36c51438c986535a7248ed2e7f424f8e1078 +Author: Simon Kelley +Date: Wed Mar 25 23:16:35 2026 +0000 + + Fix buffer overflow in helper.c with large CLIDs. CVE-2026-4892 + + Bug reported bt Royce M + + Location: helper.c:265-270 + DHCPv6 CLIDs can be up to 65535 bytes. When --dhcp-script is configured, + the helper hex-encodes raw CLID bytes via sprintf("%.2x") into daemon->packet (5131 bytes). + A 1000-byte CLID writes ~3000 bytes. The helper process retains root privileges. + + Note: log6_packet() correctly caps CLID to 100 bytes for logging, but the helper code path was missed. + +--- a/src/helper.c ++++ b/src/helper.c +@@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ int create_helper(int event_fd, int err_ + data.hostname_len + data.ed_len + data.clid_len, RW_READ)) + continue; + +- /* CLID into packet */ +- for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len; i++) ++ /* CLID into packet: limit to 100 bytes to avoid overflowing buffer. */ ++ for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len && i < 100; i++) + { + p += sprintf(p, "%.2x", buf[i]); + if (i != data.clid_len - 1) diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/005-CVE-2026-4893.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/005-CVE-2026-4893.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..664f00f90e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/005-CVE-2026-4893.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +commit 434d68f2eb1a58744470698483a3ae09b5a9a870 +Author: Simon Kelley +Date: Wed Mar 25 23:22:37 2026 +0000 + + Fix broken client subnet validation. CVE-2026-4893 + + Bug report from Royce M + + Location: forward.c:713, edns0.c:421 + + With --add-subnet enabled, process_reply() passes the OPT record + length (~23 bytes) instead of the packet length to check_source(). + All internal bounds checks fail, and the function always returns 1. + ECS source validation per RFC 7871 Section 9.2 is completely bypassed. + +--- a/src/forward.c ++++ b/src/forward.c +@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_h + /* Get extended RCODE. */ + rcode |= sizep[2] << 4; + +- if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, plen, pheader, query_source)) ++ if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, n, pheader, query_source)) + { + my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet option mismatch")); + return 0; diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/006-CVE-2026-5172.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/006-CVE-2026-5172.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f44234bd5a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/006-CVE-2026-5172.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +commit fa3c8ddef6712b52f562813317e6a997e1210123 +Author: Simon Kelley +Date: Mon Mar 30 16:24:33 2026 +0100 + + Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in extract_addresses() CVE-2026-5172 + + Thanks to Hugo Martinez Ray for spotting this. + + The value of rdlen for an RR can be a lie, allowing the + call to extract_name() at rfc1025.c:952 to advance the value of p1 + past the calculated end of the record. The makes the calculation + of bytes remaining in the RR underflow to a huge number and results + in a massive heap OOB read and certain crash. + +--- a/src/rfc1035.c ++++ b/src/rfc1035.c +@@ -943,7 +943,8 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header + /* Name, extract it then re-encode. */ + int len; + +- if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) ++ /* rdlen may lie, and extract_name() advances p1 past where it says the record ends. */ ++ if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) || (p1 > endrr)) + { + blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata); + return 2;