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Hauke Mehrtens
fc652db52a
Commita12cec9ea3("wifi-scripts: ucode: advertise SAE-EXT-KEY AKM alongside SAE") advertised the SAE-EXT-KEY AKM (00-0F-AC:24, SAE using a group-dependent hash, aka SAE-GDH) by default on every sae, sae-mixed and sae-compat BSS. WPA3 Specification v3.5 only makes this AKM mandatory when the BSS enables EHT or MLO (section 2.5, item 4); for HE and below it is merely recommended (sections 2.2 and 2.3). In practice the FT-SAE-EXT-KEY AKM (SAE-EXT-KEY combined with 802.11r), which gets added automatically once Fast Transition is enabled, keeps some clients from associating (a Samsung Galaxy Tab S10 FE) or makes them reboot shortly after connecting (a Poco X6). Plain SAE-EXT-KEY without FT was seen to work on the same tablet, but its interoperability is not well tested. Drop the fixed schema default and pick the default from the auth type in parse_encryption instead. Only default it on where it is both mandatory and safe to offer: on Compatibility mode (sae-compat) BSSes running an EHT htmode, which carry it in a separate RSN Override element that legacy clients ignore. Keep it off for WPA3-Personal (sae) and Transition (sae-mixed) mode, where it would sit in the main RSNE that a choking client cannot ignore, and off on non-EHT BSSes. An explicit 'option sae_ext_key 0/1' still overrides this per BSS. The SAE-EXT-KEY AKM in the sae-compat RSN Override 2 element now keys off config.sae_ext_key alone; the extra config.rsn_override_pairwise_2 guard is dropped, decoupling the AKM from the GCMP-256 pairwise cipher so each follows its own option. Fixes:a12cec9ea3("wifi-scripts: ucode: advertise SAE-EXT-KEY AKM alongside SAE") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/24041 Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>