diff --git a/admin/sudo/Makefile b/admin/sudo/Makefile index b6ea46a526..ad271d608d 100644 --- a/admin/sudo/Makefile +++ b/admin/sudo/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=sudo PKG_VERSION:=1.8.28p1 -PKG_RELEASE:=1 +PKG_RELEASE:=2 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.sudo.ws/dist diff --git a/admin/sudo/patches/030-CVE-2021-3156.patch b/admin/sudo/patches/030-CVE-2021-3156.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ca24d2104 --- /dev/null +++ b/admin/sudo/patches/030-CVE-2021-3156.patch @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +From c21b1fd2a43e67eff4048e624ac77769df951818 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" +Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 08:43:59 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Reset valid_flags to MODE_NONINTERACTIVE for sudoedit. + This is consistent with how the -e option is handled. Also reject -H and -P + flags for sudoedit as was done in sudo 1.7. Found by Qualys, this is part of + the fix for CVE-2021-3156. + +--- + src/parse_args.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/parse_args.c b/src/parse_args.c +index 260c41f66..883ab80a5 100644 +--- a/src/parse_args.c ++++ b/src/parse_args.c +@@ -124,7 +124,10 @@ struct environment { + /* + * Default flags allowed when running a command. + */ +-#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_SHELL) ++#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS|MODE_SHELL) ++#define EDIT_VALID_FLAGS MODE_NONINTERACTIVE ++#define LIST_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST) ++#define VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS MODE_NONINTERACTIVE + + /* Option number for the --host long option due to ambiguity of the -h flag. */ + #define OPT_HOSTNAME 256 +@@ -269,6 +272,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + progname = "sudoedit"; + mode = MODE_EDIT; + sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true"; ++ valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS; + } + + /* Load local IP addresses and masks. */ +@@ -360,7 +364,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + usage_excl(1); + mode = MODE_EDIT; + sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true"; +- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE; ++ valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS; + break; + case 'g': + assert(optarg != NULL); +@@ -371,6 +375,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + break; + case 'H': + sudo_settings[ARG_SET_HOME].value = "true"; ++ SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME); + break; + case 'h': + if (optarg == NULL) { +@@ -421,7 +426,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + usage_excl(1); + } + mode = MODE_LIST; +- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST; ++ valid_flags = LIST_VALID_FLAGS; + break; + case 'n': + SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE); +@@ -429,6 +434,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + break; + case 'P': + sudo_settings[ARG_PRESERVE_GROUPS].value = "true"; ++ SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS); + break; + case 'p': + /* An empty prompt is allowed. */ +@@ -478,7 +484,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + if (mode && mode != MODE_VALIDATE) + usage_excl(1); + mode = MODE_VALIDATE; +- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE; ++ valid_flags = VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS; + break; + case 'V': + if (mode && mode != MODE_VERSION) +@@ -505,7 +511,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + if (!mode) { + /* Defer -k mode setting until we know whether it is a flag or not */ + if (sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value != NULL) { +- if (argc == 0 && !(flags & (MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))) { ++ if (argc == 0 && !ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + mode = MODE_INVALIDATE; /* -k by itself */ + sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value = NULL; + valid_flags = 0; +@@ -568,7 +574,7 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + /* + * For shell mode we need to rewrite argv + */ +- if (ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN) && ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) { ++ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN)) { + char **av, *cmnd = NULL; + int ac = 1; + +-- +2.25.1 + + +From 75b4169392317cdee95e2ddf1410625e5a1d409b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" +Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 08:44:00 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Don't assume that argv is allocated as a single flat + buffer. While this is how the kernel behaves it is not a portable assumption. + The assumption may also be violated if getopt_long(3) permutes arguments. + Found by Qualys. + +--- + src/parse_args.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/parse_args.c b/src/parse_args.c +index 883ab80a5..127853c30 100644 +--- a/src/parse_args.c ++++ b/src/parse_args.c +@@ -581,16 +581,16 @@ parse_args(int argc, char **argv, int *nargc, char ***nargv, + if (argc != 0) { + /* shell -c "command" */ + char *src, *dst; +- size_t cmnd_size = (size_t) (argv[argc - 1] - argv[0]) + +- strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 1; ++ size_t size = 0; + +- cmnd = dst = reallocarray(NULL, cmnd_size, 2); +- if (cmnd == NULL) ++ for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) ++ size += strlen(*av) + 1; ++ if (size == 0 || (cmnd = reallocarray(NULL, size, 2)) == NULL) + sudo_fatalx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + if (!gc_add(GC_PTR, cmnd)) + exit(1); + +- for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) { ++ for (dst = cmnd, av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) { + for (src = *av; *src != '\0'; src++) { + /* quote potential meta characters */ + if (!isalnum((unsigned char)*src) && *src != '_' && *src != '-' && *src != '$') +-- +2.25.1 + + +From 58e57a748cbbf5cfb6020d615325257760b4b913 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" +Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 08:43:59 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Fix potential buffer overflow when unescaping backslashes + in user_args. + +Also, do not try to unescaping backslashes unless in run mode *and* +we are running the command via a shell. +Found by Qualys, this fixes CVE-2021-3156. +--- + plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c +index 15a002872..1ca779cb3 100644 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c +@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[], + + /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */ + /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */ +- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { ++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { + if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { + struct passwd *pw; + +@@ -786,8 +786,8 @@ set_cmnd(void) + if (user_cmnd == NULL) + user_cmnd = NewArgv[0]; + +- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) { +- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) { ++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT|MODE_CHECK)) { ++ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt()) + path = def_secure_path; + if (!set_perms(PERM_RUNAS)) +@@ -825,7 +825,8 @@ set_cmnd(void) + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_int(-1); + } +- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { ++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && ++ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { + /* + * When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end + * escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces +@@ -833,10 +834,22 @@ set_cmnd(void) + */ + for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) { + while (*from) { +- if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) ++ if (from[0] == '\\' && from[1] != '\0' && ++ !isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) { + from++; ++ } ++ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) { ++ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"), ++ __func__); ++ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR); ++ } + *to++ = *from++; + } ++ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) { ++ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"), ++ __func__); ++ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR); ++ } + *to++ = ' '; + } + *--to = '\0'; +-- +2.25.1 + +From 0754533d2445c93a380c362a185b5464c417455e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" +Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 08:44:00 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Fix the memset offset when converting a v1 timestamp to + TS_LOCKEXCL. We want to zero the struct starting at flags, not type (which + was just set). Found by Qualys. + +--- + plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c b/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c +index d315723af..515eadd79 100644 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c +@@ -652,8 +652,8 @@ timestamp_lock(void *vcookie, struct passwd *pw) + } else if (entry.type != TS_LOCKEXCL) { + /* Old sudo record, convert it to TS_LOCKEXCL. */ + entry.type = TS_LOCKEXCL; +- memset((char *)&entry + offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, type), 0, +- nread - offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, type)); ++ memset((char *)&entry + offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, flags), 0, ++ nread - offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, flags)); + if (ts_write(cookie->fd, cookie->fname, &entry, 0) == -1) + debug_return_bool(false); + } +-- +2.25.1 +