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dnsmasq: update to 2.93
Changelog: https://github.com/imp/dnsmasq/blob/master/CHANGELOG#L1-L35 Removed upstreamed patches: - 001-CVE-2026-2291.patch - 002-CVE-2026-4890.dnsmasq-2.92.patch - 003-CVE-2026-4891.patch - 004-CVE-2026-4892.patch - 005-CVE-2026-4893.patch - 006-CVE-2026-5172.patch All other patches rebased. Build system: x86/64 Build-tested: x86/64-glibc Run-tested: x86/64-glibc Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me> Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23669 Signed-off-by: Jonas Jelonek <jelonek.jonas@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
John Audia
committed by
Jonas Jelonek
Jonas Jelonek
parent
6c3d37c6c8
commit
117f10e9a2
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
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include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=dnsmasq
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PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION:=2.92
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PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION:=2.93
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PKG_VERSION:=$(subst test,~~test,$(subst rc,~rc,$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION)))
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PKG_RELEASE:=2
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PKG_RELEASE:=1
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PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION).tar.xz
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/
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PKG_HASH:=4bf50c2c1018f9fbc26037df51b90ecea0cb73d46162846763b92df0d6c3a458
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PKG_HASH:=0c00d4e5c97c8306e5fb932b348b34269c9c29a0e7df0e8e82958b407092bc19
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PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
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PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
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@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
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commit ec2fbfbbdaa7d7db1c707dce26ce1a37cfe09660
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Fri Apr 10 16:29:31 2026 +0100
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Fix buffer overflow in struct bigname. CVE-2026-2291
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All buffers capable of holding a domain name should be
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at least MAXDNAME*2 + 1 bytes long, where MAXDNAME is the maximum
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size of a domain name. The accounts for the trailing zero and the
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fact that some characters are escaped in the internal representation
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of a domain name in dnsmasq.
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The declaration of struct bigname get this wrong, with the effect
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that a remote attacker capable of asking DNS queries or answering DNS
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queries can cause a large OOB write in the heap.
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This was first spotted by Andrew S. Fasano.
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
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@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ struct interface_name {
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};
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union bigname {
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- char name[MAXDNAME];
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+ char name[(2*MAXDNAME) + 1];
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union bigname *next; /* freelist */
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};
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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
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commit 4fdb707633afe8028118bcaf39b4882f634b5999
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Fri Apr 10 16:24:02 2026 +0100
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Fix NSEC bitmap parsing infinite loop. CVE-2026-4890
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Report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>.
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Location: dnssec.c:1290-1306, dnssec.c:1450-1463
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The bitmap window iteration advances by p[1] instead of p[1]+2
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(missing the 2-byte window header). With bitmap_length=0, both rdlen and p are
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unchanged, causing an infinite loop and dnsmasq stops responding to all queries.
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Reachable before RRSIG validation
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(confirmed by the source comment at line 2125), so no valid
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DNSSEC signatures are needed.
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--- a/src/dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/dnssec.c
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@@ -1344,8 +1344,8 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(stru
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break; /* finished checking */
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}
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- rdlen -= p[1];
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- p += p[1];
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+ rdlen -= p[1] + 2;
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+ p += p[1] + 2;
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}
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return 0;
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@@ -1508,8 +1508,8 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct d
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break; /* finished checking */
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}
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- rdlen -= p[1];
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- p += p[1];
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+ rdlen -= p[1] + 2;
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+ p += p[1] + 2;
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}
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return 1;
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@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
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commit 2cacea42e4d45717bd0ce3ccfe8e78960245e5da
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Wed Mar 25 23:04:08 2026 +0000
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Verify rdlen field in RRSIG packets. CVE-2026-4891
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Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
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This avoids crafted packets which give a value for rdlen _less_
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then the space taken up by the fixed data and the signer's name
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and engender a negative calculated length for the signature.
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--- a/src/dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/dnssec.c
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@@ -546,10 +546,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
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*ttl_out = ttl;
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}
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-
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+
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+ /* Don't trust rdlen not to be too small and give us a negative sig_len
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+ It has already been checked that it doesn't run us off the end
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+ of the packet. */
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+ if ((sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav)) <= 0)
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+ return STAT_BOGUS;
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+
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sig = p;
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- sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav);
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-
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nsigttl = htonl(orig_ttl);
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hash->update(ctx, 18, psav);
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@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
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commit 011a36c51438c986535a7248ed2e7f424f8e1078
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Wed Mar 25 23:16:35 2026 +0000
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Fix buffer overflow in helper.c with large CLIDs. CVE-2026-4892
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Bug reported bt Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
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Location: helper.c:265-270
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DHCPv6 CLIDs can be up to 65535 bytes. When --dhcp-script is configured,
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the helper hex-encodes raw CLID bytes via sprintf("%.2x") into daemon->packet (5131 bytes).
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A 1000-byte CLID writes ~3000 bytes. The helper process retains root privileges.
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Note: log6_packet() correctly caps CLID to 100 bytes for logging, but the helper code path was missed.
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--- a/src/helper.c
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+++ b/src/helper.c
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@@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ int create_helper(int event_fd, int err_
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data.hostname_len + data.ed_len + data.clid_len, RW_READ))
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continue;
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- /* CLID into packet */
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- for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len; i++)
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+ /* CLID into packet: limit to 100 bytes to avoid overflowing buffer. */
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+ for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len && i < 100; i++)
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{
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p += sprintf(p, "%.2x", buf[i]);
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if (i != data.clid_len - 1)
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@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
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commit 434d68f2eb1a58744470698483a3ae09b5a9a870
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Wed Mar 25 23:22:37 2026 +0000
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Fix broken client subnet validation. CVE-2026-4893
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Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
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Location: forward.c:713, edns0.c:421
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With --add-subnet enabled, process_reply() passes the OPT record
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length (~23 bytes) instead of the packet length to check_source().
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All internal bounds checks fail, and the function always returns 1.
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ECS source validation per RFC 7871 Section 9.2 is completely bypassed.
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--- a/src/forward.c
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+++ b/src/forward.c
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@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_h
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/* Get extended RCODE. */
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rcode |= sizep[2] << 4;
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- if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, plen, pheader, query_source))
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+ if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, n, pheader, query_source))
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{
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my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet option mismatch"));
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return 0;
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@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
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commit fa3c8ddef6712b52f562813317e6a997e1210123
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Mon Mar 30 16:24:33 2026 +0100
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Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in extract_addresses() CVE-2026-5172
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Thanks to Hugo Martinez Ray for spotting this.
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The value of rdlen for an RR can be a lie, allowing the
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call to extract_name() at rfc1025.c:952 to advance the value of p1
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past the calculated end of the record. The makes the calculation
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of bytes remaining in the RR underflow to a huge number and results
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in a massive heap OOB read and certain crash.
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--- a/src/rfc1035.c
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+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
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@@ -943,7 +943,8 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header
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/* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
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int len;
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- if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
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+ /* rdlen may lie, and extract_name() advances p1 past where it says the record ends. */
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+ if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) || (p1 > endrr))
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{
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blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
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return 2;
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+8
-5
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
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@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
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@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
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int inotifyfd;
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#endif
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#if defined(HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK)
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@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
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#elif defined(HAVE_BSD_NETWORK)
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int dhcp_raw_fd, dhcp_icmp_fd, routefd;
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#endif
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@@ -1519,9 +1519,6 @@ int read_write(int fd, unsigned char *pa
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@@ -1544,9 +1544,6 @@ int read_writev(int fd, struct iovec *io
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void close_fds(long max_fd, int spare1, int spare2, int spare3);
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int wildcard_match(const char* wildcard, const char* match);
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int wildcard_matchn(const char* wildcard, const char* match, int num);
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@@ -140,11 +140,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
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my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to update ipset %s: %s"), setname, strerror(errno));
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--- a/src/util.c
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+++ b/src/util.c
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@@ -930,22 +930,3 @@ int wildcard_matchn(const char* wildcard
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@@ -928,25 +928,6 @@ int wildcard_matchn(const char* wildcard
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return (!num) || (*wildcard == *match);
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}
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-
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-#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
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-int kernel_version(void)
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-{
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@@ -163,3 +162,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
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- return version * 256 + (split ? atoi(split) : 0);
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-}
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-#endif
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-
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#define hash_ptr(x) (((uintptr_t)(x)) & 0xffffff)
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void *whine_malloc_real(const char *func, unsigned int line, size_t size)
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.c
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.c
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@@ -2123,6 +2123,10 @@ static void do_tcp_connection(struct lis
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@@ -2184,6 +2184,10 @@ static void do_tcp_connection(struct lis
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daemon->pipe_to_parent = pipefd[1];
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}
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
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Reset that here. */
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
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@@ -1722,14 +1722,26 @@ void emit_dbus_signal(int action, struct
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@@ -1747,14 +1747,26 @@ void emit_dbus_signal(int action, struct
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/* ubus.c */
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#ifdef HAVE_UBUS
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
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/* EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT -> extract name
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EXTR_NAME_COMPARE -> compare name, case insensitive
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@@ -444,10 +446,65 @@ int private_net6(struct in6_addr *a, int
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@@ -452,10 +454,65 @@ int private_net6(struct in6_addr *a, int
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((u32 *)a)[0] == htonl(0x20010db8); /* RFC 6303 4.6 */
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}
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@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
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int done = 0;
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if (!(p = skip_questions(header, qlen)))
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@@ -464,7 +521,7 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
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@@ -472,7 +529,7 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
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GETSHORT(qtype, p);
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GETSHORT(qclass, p);
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@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
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GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
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if (qclass == C_IN && qtype == T_A)
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@@ -475,6 +532,9 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
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@@ -483,6 +540,9 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
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if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, qlen, INADDRSZ))
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return done;
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@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
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/* alignment */
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memcpy(&addr.addr4, p, INADDRSZ);
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@@ -504,6 +564,14 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
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@@ -512,6 +572,14 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
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break;
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}
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}
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