handle_send_a() computed the SRP "A" parameter length as
len = ntohl(msg->len) - sizeof(struct ead_msg_number);
sizeof(struct ead_msg_number) is 1, and the subtraction is evaluated in
unsigned arithmetic. A packet with msg->len == 0 therefore wraps the
result to a huge value which, assigned to the signed int len, becomes -1.
The following bounds check is signed:
if (len > MAXPARAMLEN + 1)
return false;
so -1 passes, and memcpy(A.data, number->data, len) runs with len cast to
size_t (~SIZE_MAX) against the 257-byte abuf, crashing the daemon.
Neither parse_message() nor handle_packet() validate msg->len (only the
captured packet length), so an unauthenticated attacker on the local
segment can reach this path and crash ead with a single crafted packet.
Validate the claimed length in unsigned arithmetic before the subtraction
and bound it on both sides. Doing the upper-bound check unsigned as well
also closes a 32-bit-only variant where sizeof(ead_packet) + msg->len
overflows in handle_packet(), letting a large msg->len reach the same
negative-len path.
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-9558-77jp-g3fw
Reported-by: @Vasco0x4
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Update to 2.5.3 and use the official tarball.
Changelog: https://github.com/ppp-project/ppp/releases/tag/v2.5.3
Removed upstreamed:
- 000-pppd-session-fixed-building-with-gcc-15.patch
- 001-pppdump-fixed-building-with-gcc-15.patch
- 501-fix-memcpy-fortify.patch
- 502-remove_mru.patch
Manually rebased:
- 500-add-pptp-plugin.patch
Add a pending patch to relax the check to avoid breaking existing
configurations.
Signed-off-by: Qingfang Deng <dqfext@gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23540
Signed-off-by: Jonas Jelonek <jelonek.jonas@gmail.com>
Verify and clean up client ID and global DUID config values before use, in
order to prevent DHCP client malfunction and loss of IPv4 and/or IPv6
connectivity.
- Accept common separators in the string (colon, dash, spaces/tabs, lf)
- Ignore invalid values (non-hex or odd-numbered length)
- Log a warning for invalid settings
The fall back mechanism is as follows:
If a (user-configured) network.<ifname>.clientid setting is found invalid,
ignore and fall back to using network.globals.dhcp_default_duid. In case
that's also invalid (e.g. has been tampered with), don't pass a client
ID to updhc/odhcpc. In that case, udhcpc/odhcpc will use their defaults,
which currently is the i/f MAC address resp. the i/f DUID-LL.
Only error handling is introduced, no behavior change for valid settings.
Signed-off-by: Shine <4c.fce2@proton.me>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23662
Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com>
The mutex file via '/tmp/.config_pending' should prevent the command
'/sbin/wifi config' from being called in the ieee80211 hotplug when loading
the kernel modules [1]. Since the file '/etc/board.json' does not yet exist
and could be incomplete.
The '/etc/board.json' file is modified in the '/sbin/wifi config' script.
This is only generated during the first boot when '/bin/config_generate' is
called.
This whole handling is unclean. Therefore the creation of the default
configuration '/etc/config/network', '/etc/config/system' and
'/etc/board.json' via '/sbin/config_generate' is moved to the preinint
after the rootfile system has been mounted
The advantage now is that on an ieee80211 hotplug event, the
'/etc/board.json' is already present which simplifies the whole thing.
[1] https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/blob/main/package/network/config/wifi-scripts/files/etc/hotplug.d/ieee80211/10-wifi-detect
Fixes: b993a00b82 ("base-files: fix duplicate wifi radio sections when using phy renaming")
Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
08bd058e0246 ra: skip malformed options instead of aborting RA processing
2550a1dd276e dhcpv6: fix inverted Authentication option validation in Reply
496e55d43de6 dhcpv6: use host-order option length in Authentication validation
b6f0c70f5fc2 dhcpv6: fix out-of-bounds end pointer when parsing IA in Advertise
92fd11cd9547 dhcpv6: fix OOB read and 1-byte heap overflow on captive-portal option
0dab8feec55a ra: fix OOB read on captive-portal option comparison
a4d6a3232c24 script: fix string_to_env writing garbage and reading past input
2521bf732b9f script: avoid kill(0) when SIGCHLD races script_call
56cec7a15816 odhcp6c: drop stale hash_ifname() declaration
49d9c0112bb8 odhcp6c: propagate allocation failure from insert_state
4bd976fd60c0 dhcpv6: ensure hostname buffer is NUL-terminated for dn_comp
6d12865fb89c ubus: validate element type when parsing reconfigure_dhcp opt_send
01130f80338a script: handle allocation failures in env helpers
0a19052dc9fb odhcp6c: refuse to follow symlinks when writing pidfile
d6c2fbdc255c odhcp6c: skip malformed /proc/net/if_inet6 entries
b6add6c0e30e dhcpv6: avoid signed-shift undefined behaviour in IAID derivation
ce52fe118b13 ubus: clear cached object type id on disconnect
91f88c694f6f config: stop mutating caller-supplied buffers in send-options parser
c938c168cbef script: handle fork() failure when launching state script
1546a48255b2 ubus: avoid out-of-bounds read when serializing captive-portal URI
3270f081039d all: fix inverted captive-portal URI equality check (RFC 8910 §3)
e9a9e9d45f38 odhcp6c: bound the address length when parsing the -P argument
5ad94c86e864 script: walk entries with odhcp6c_next_entry in entry_to_env
df4f199c02fc ubus: walk entries correctly and don't leak an open table in entry_to_blob
6c1c4c48d4a2 ubus: don't leak an open table on malformed S46 rule/bind in s46_to_blob
1797d2bca3c0 odhcp6c: remove pidfile on exit
86a6665e4bb0 ra: clear captive-portal state when router signals unrestricted URI
0a4e51db30d5 dhcpv6: require known SERVERID when validating Reconfigure
afc3c8534864 dhcpv6: reject Reconfigure with malformed or duplicate Message option
df27a49c98d8 dhcpv6: enforce monotonic replay counter on Reconfigure RKAP
9177f236c2d7 odhcp6c: do not treat DHCPv6 option type 0 as end-of-list
daf4ec3054e7 example: write all DNS servers to resolv.conf
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23652
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The unet CLI's join handler used the joiner's --network value as the
local network name, so an unspecified --network fell back to the
literal 'unet'. The inviter typically uses a different name (e.g.
ucoord_<venue>), so the two sides ended up keyed differently and any
upper layer subscribing to the network-named unetmsg channel never
saw each other.
The inviter now passes enroll_info={ network } to enroll_start so
the inviter's network name rides along in enroll_meta. The joiner
prefers data.enroll_meta?.network when present, falling back to its
own --network value for backwards compatibility with older inviters.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Version 7.0 - Apr 28, 2026
* Feature: support MSE display (--show-mse)
* Feature: add 2 new link_ext_state names
* Fix: fix index calculation in ixgbe register dump (-d)
* Fix: cmis wavelength tolerance output (-m)
* Fix: duplicate sfpid Active Cu compliance output (-m)
Signed-off-by: Paul Donald <newtwen+github@gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23574
Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com>
- try to detect supported (hostkey) algorithms; otherwise fallback to predefined list;
- remove size constraint for ECDSA: custom build may include only 384 or 521 bit curves;
- remove size constraint for RSA: default RSA key size is 2048 bits which is sufficient for SSH security recommendations, and previous value of 1024 bits is considered insecure.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23217
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
f5d17dd60a89 mstp: add default Hello Time constant
17c36bebada1 mstp: use default Hello Time in recordTimes
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
he_phy_cap and he_mac_cap in phy_capabilities are only populated inside
the iftype_data loop. On 6GHz-only radios (e.g. QCN9074/ath11k_pci),
when capability bytes are unavailable they remain null, causing null
dereferences in device_htmode_append():
Reference error: left-hand side expression is null
if (!(he_phy_cap[3] & 0x80))
Initialise both to [] before the loop and guard the consumer side with
?? [] so bitwise checks conservatively disable beamformer/beamformee/twt
features rather than crashing.
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/23488
Signed-off-by: dastarothx <darkastalier@gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23496
Signed-off-by: Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth@gmail.com>
Replace exit(1) on every failure path with return null so callers that
iterate over multiple radios can collect results from the radios that
did succeed instead of aborting on the first one that refuses an
off-channel scan.
Route diagnostics to stderr via warn() so stdout stays clean for
callers parsing JSON output, and include the device name in each
message to disambiguate per-radio failures.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
In case OpenWrt is used to build a custom distribution, the default
button handling logic may be undesired.
Add config options to disable default standard button handling code
at build-time.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
The current 150s watchdog timeout is too aggressive, leading to
premature hostname re-resolution on alive connections.
Even with a 25s keepalive, handshakes may not occur within the 150s window.
Increasing the timeout to 180s aligns the watchdog with WireGuard's
REJECT_AFTER_TIME constant, ensuring we only re-resolve when the connection
is truly considered dead.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Almeida Silva <robertoalmeidasilva1981@gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23248
Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com>
The ucode migration wrote "basic_rate" into the wpa_supplicant network
block, but that is not a valid wpa_supplicant network field, causing:
Line 15: unknown network field 'basic_rate'.
failed to parse network block.
Map UCI basic_rate to the correct wpa_supplicant fields, matching the
behavior of the legacy shell script (hostapd.sh):
- mesh mode: mesh_basic_rates (space-separated, 100 kb/s units)
- sta/adhoc: rates (comma-separated Mbps)
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/a854d833eabdbc3b42065927c136d75b981a1021
Signed-off-by: Florian Maurer <f.maurer@outlook.de>
[fix commit message link]
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
In AP+STA mode, wifi-scripts emits start_disabled=1 in the per-BSS
section of the generated hostapd config so that hostapd defers
beaconing on every BSS until apsta_state up clears the flag for the
whole iface (uc_hostapd_iface_start clears start_disabled on every BSS
and calls ieee802_11_set_beacon).
When a new BSS is added later via iface.add_bss while the iface is
already in HAPD_IFACE_ENABLED state, the freshly parsed config still
carries start_disabled=1 for that BSS. hostapd_setup_bss is invoked
with start_beacon=true, but hostapd_start_beacon then skips
ieee802_11_set_beacon because conf->start_disabled is set. The kernel
netdev is created without ever starting beacons, the carrier never
comes up, and probe-response transmission attempts fail with
"handle_probe_req: send failed".
Mirror what iface.start does: when the iface is already enabled, the
apsta channel selection has happened, so clear start_disabled for the
incoming BSS before starting it.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Surface SAE confirm mismatches (wrong password) through the same
key-mismatch ubus notification that is already used for PSK failures, so
consumers can react uniformly regardless of the authentication method.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
mld_set_config() treated any call with empty prev_mld as a fresh
configuration and triggered a full Reload all interfaces, even when the
new config was also empty (the typical path on non-MLD devices).
Reloading every BSS on each netifd reconf disrupted associated stations
including PMF-protected backhaul STAs, which would self-deauth after the
SA Query timeout.
Only treat the call as a new configuration when the new config is
actually non-empty.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Backport upstream iw commit d90618809e06 ("iw: scan: print RSN
Element Override IEs") as 001-*.patch so `iw scan` decodes the
RSNOE (vendor WFA type 41) and RSNO2E (type 42) elements that
hostapd emits for WPA3 Compatibility / RSN Overriding APs.
Also refresh the hunk offsets in 200-reduce_size.patch.
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Two of the IW_FULL guards in 200-reduce_size.patch were inverted
or incomplete:
* the "unknown event" handler unconditionally replaced the
verbose print with the short form, so IW_FULL builds lost
the command name decoding;
* the early return before the vendor IE parser used
#ifdef IW_FULL, which suppressed parsing in the full build
instead of the size-reduced one.
Wrap both with the correct #ifndef IW_FULL / #else so the full
and reduced builds produce the intended output.
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Deployment Guide v1.1 (Table 4,
"SAE Groups") recommends that WPA3-Personal APs advertise support
for SAE groups 19, 20 and 21:
* group 19 - ECP 256-bit (NIST P-256)
* group 20 - ECP 384-bit (NIST P-384)
* group 21 - ECP 521-bit (NIST P-521)
hostapd's default is group 19 only, which leaves the two larger
ECP groups unavailable even though the peer may prefer them.
Set sae_groups = "19 20 21" as the default for any BSS whose
auth_type is sae or psk-sae (SAE, SAE Transition and SAE
Compatibility modes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Deployment and Implementation Guide
v1.1 (Tables 4, 5, 6) requires the group-management cipher (BIP) to
match the mode and strength of the pairwise cipher: GCM-mode pairwise
ciphers pair with BIP-GMAC integrity, CCM-mode pairwise ciphers with
BIP-CMAC integrity. The ucode pipeline hard-coded group_mgmt_cipher
to AES-128-CMAC (BIP-CMAC-128) regardless of the pairwise cipher,
except for the eap192 special case that already forced BIP-GMAC-256.
An EHT WPA3-Personal BSS therefore emitted wpa_pairwise=GCMP-256
alongside group_mgmt_cipher=AES-128-CMAC -- the integrity cipher two
steps weaker than the data cipher and a spec violation on EHT.
hostapd has a single group_mgmt_cipher knob, so the selected BIP has
to be compatible with every pairwise cipher in wpa_pairwise. Picking
from the first token would mis-select on mixed lists -- e.g.
wpa_pairwise=\"GCMP-256 CCMP\" would yield BIP-GMAC-256, which a
CCMP-only STA cannot negotiate.
Walk the wpa_pairwise tokens and pick the BIP that matches the
weakest cipher present:
CCMP / TKIP -> AES-128-CMAC (BIP-CMAC-128)
CCMP-256 -> BIP-CMAC-256
GCMP -> BIP-GMAC-128
GCMP-256 -> BIP-GMAC-256
Token matching uses fnmatch wildcards against a copy of wpa_pairwise
that is padded with leading and trailing spaces, so each token is
space-bounded regardless of its position in the list.
The RSN override pairwise lists are not consulted: in the only
caller that sets them (WPA3-Personal Compatibility Mode), Tables 6
and 7 require BIP-CMAC-128 across RSNE/RSNOE/RSNO2E even when the
override lists advertise GCMP-256, so wpa_pairwise=CCMP already
yields the correct BIP.
An explicit ieee80211w_mgmt_cipher UCI value still wins over the
derived default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
WPA3 Specification v3.5 §13 defines the Transition Disable element sent
inside message 3 of the 4-way handshake. An AP that is no longer
offering a transition mode for its SSID sets the matching bit so that
compliant STAs permanently stop falling back to WPA-PSK / WPA-EAP /
open for that SSID, hardening against downgrade attacks and against
operator mistakes where a transition-mode BSS is briefly brought up on
an SSID that previously ran WPA3-only.
Expose this as a UCI list 'transition_disable' with three classes of
entries:
* The existing OpenWrt encryption tokens 'sae' (bit 0x01), 'sae-pk'
(0x02), 'wpa3' (0x04) and 'owe' (0x08) OR into the bitmap. SAE-PK
itself is not yet wired through wifi-scripts; the token only lets
an operator who configured SAE-PK out of band also hand the
matching bit to hostapd.
* 'on' derives the bitmap from the AP's auth_type ('sae' -> 0x01,
'eap2'/'eap192' -> 0x04, pure 'owe' -> 0x08) and overrides any
other explicit tokens in the same list. Transition BSSes
(psk-sae, eap-eap2, owe with owe_transition set) produce no
bits even under 'on' because they are by definition still in
transition.
* 'off' unconditionally suppresses the element regardless of any
other entries. Operators who need to revert a WPA3-only SSID back
to a transition mode can set this proactively, giving compliant
STAs time to forget the permanent bit before the mode change.
Leave the list unset by default. Advertising Transition Disable is a
one-way door -- once a compliant STA has seen the permanent bit for an
SSID it will refuse to associate to a transition-mode BSS of the same
name ever again -- so it must be opted in to per SSID, never flipped
on by a firmware bump. This also matches the WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced
Open Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.1 Table 4 requirement that
Transition Disable be MAND disabled by default on APs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Deployment and Implementation Guide
v1.1 (Tables 7 and 8) mandates "H2E Only" for SAE on 6 GHz, in both
WPA3-Personal Only and WPA3-Personal Compatibility Mode: the 6 GHz
band disallows the legacy Hunting-and-Pecking password element, so
the AP must advertise BSS Membership Selector 123 to force STAs onto
H2E.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Deployment and Implementation Guide
v1.1 §2.4 (Tables 6 and 7) defines WPA3-Personal Compatibility Mode:
the AP advertises a legacy-looking RSNE (WPA-PSK, CCMP-128, PMF
Disabled) while RSN Override Elements layered on top expose SAE and,
on EHT, SAE-EXT-KEY. WPA2-only STAs and STAs that ignore RSN
Overriding associate unchanged; modern STAs pick up the stronger WPA3
AKM via RSNOE or RSNO2E.
Only the pairwise cipher differs between elements: RSNE and RSNOE
advertise CCMP-128, RSNO2E advertises GCMP-256 (EHT only). Group
data (CCMP-128) and group management cipher (BIP-CMAC-128) are the
same in all three per Tables 6/7, so hostapd's BSS-wide group_cipher
and group_mgmt_cipher singletons produce the spec-correct values.
Unlike WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (sae-mixed), which puts PSK and
SAE together in the main RSNE with PMF Capable, Compatibility Mode
keeps the main RSNE strictly WPA2-shaped so clients that choke on a
mixed AKM list or PMF=Capable still see a pure WPA2 BSS. The trade-
off is that clients without RSN Overriding support never pick up SAE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Deployment and Implementation Guide
v1.1, Table 4 (Common security configuration) marks Beacon Protection
as MAND for EHT-enabled APs and RECOM otherwise for all WPA3 and
Wi-Fi Enhanced Open modes.
The ucode path blindly passed beacon_prot through from UCI in iface
setup, which ran before encryption and MFP had been configured, and
left hostapd at its insecure default of 0 when the user did not
explicitly opt in.
Default beacon_prot to 1 in iface_mfp after MFP has been confirmed to
be enabled, and emit it there instead of in iface_setup so the option
is only written when PMF support is actually negotiated. Users can
still disable it explicitly via UCI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
WPA3 Specification v3.5 §2.5.4 mandates that an AP's BSS Configuration
enables AKM suite selector 00-0F-AC:24 (SAE-EXT-KEY, SAE with a
group-dependent hash) whenever EHT or MLO is enabled. The WPA3 and
Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Deployment Guide v1.1 also recommends it on
non-EHT APs (Tables 3, 5, 6, 8).
Add a new sae_ext_key UCI option (enabled by default) that advertises
SAE-EXT-KEY, and FT-SAE-EXT-KEY when 802.11r is enabled, alongside
plain SAE/FT-SAE for the sae and psk-sae encryption modes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
parse_encryption() stashed a preliminary wpa_pairwise value in a
local wpa3_pairwise variable, cleared it per auth_type, then let a
switch default either copy it back or special-case wpa3-192. The
result was three separate places where wpa_pairwise was clobbered
and behavior that was awkward to trace when the explicit cipher
suffix (encryption[1]) and the auth_type disagreed.
Replace the scaffolding with a single block at the end of
parse_encryption() that only assigns wpa_pairwise via ??= when no
earlier branch (explicit cipher suffix, wpa3-192, or sae-compat)
has already set one:
no WPA -> null
60 GHz (hw_mode=ad) -> GCMP
HE or EHT htmode -> GCMP-256 CCMP
everything else -> CCMP
wpa3-192 now sets wpa_pairwise='GCMP-256' directly in its switch
case, so the final default block can stay short. No functional
change for existing encryption values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The rsn_override UCI number was scaffolding that let a Transition
Mode BSS (sae-mixed, wpa3-mixed) automatically overlay a WPA3
Compatibility-Mode-like layout: WPA3 AKMs were moved from the main
RSNE into RSNOE/RSNO2E, and with rsn_override=2 the main RSNE even
dropped SAE entirely to placate clients that refuse to associate to
a mixed AKM list.
This layout does not match any mode defined in the WPA3 and Wi-Fi
Enhanced Open Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.1: Transition
Mode (Table 5) advertises the full AKM list in a single RSNE, and
Compatibility Mode (§2.4, Tables 6 and 7) requires a specific
combination of RSNE, RSNOE and RSNO2E contents that the knob cannot
express. In practice it also triggers interop failures: Pixel 10
phones refuse to associate to a Transition-Mode BSS whose SAE-EXT-KEY
AKM has been shoved into RSNO2E by this scaffolding, even though the
same BSS works fine when the full AKM list stays in the main RSNE.
Keep the generated configuration honest by removing the knob; the RSN
override plumbing stays in place for a future caller that sets the
override fields explicitly. SAE-EXT-KEY advertisement will be added
back in a later commit via a dedicated sae_ext_key path that places
the AKM where the Deployment Guide actually requires it.
Drop the rsn_override schema entry and every wifi-scripts path that
read it:
* parse_encryption no longer diverts the WPA3 pairwise cipher
into rsn_override_pairwise.
* wpa_key_mgmt no longer mirrors WPA-EAP into
rsn_override_key_mgmt, moves SAE/SAE-EXT-KEY into the override
for psk-sae, or drops the main RSNE AKM list when
rsn_override > 1.
* generate() no longer back-fills missing rsn_override_* fields
from the main RSNE or duplicates the override element into an
MLO-gated RSNO2E.
The RSN override elements are now emitted only when each of
(rsn_override_key_mgmt, rsn_override_pairwise, rsn_override_mfp) --
and their _2 counterparts -- has been populated explicitly, which
keeps the machinery from firing on transition modes where it was
never spec-compliant.
Fixes: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/21486
Fixes: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/22200
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
sae_require_mfp and sae_pwe are SAE-specific knobs but iface_auth_type()
set them on every auth type that requires PMF (sae, owe, eap2, eap192,
dpp) and on both PMF-optional transition modes (psk-sae, eap-eap2).
hostapd silently ignores the stray settings on non-SAE BSSes, but they
clutter the generated configuration and make it harder to tell at a
glance which knobs actually apply.
Split the grouping: keep ieee80211w (and rsn_override_mfp for transition
modes) where it was, and move sae_require_mfp / sae_pwe into a separate
check that only fires for the two auth types that actually run SAE (sae
and psk-sae).
No functional change on the air.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Hauke Mehrtens
David Bauer
Qingfang Deng
John Audia
Shine
Paul Spooren
Florian Eckert
John Crispin
Paul Donald
Konstantin Demin
Stijn Tintel
dastarothx
Felix Fietkau
Andy Chiang
Hannu Nyman
Roberto Almeida Silva
Florian Maurer